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Abstract
This paper studies how the interaction between the monetary policy regime and
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1 Introduction
The effects of fiscal shocks and their international transmission have long been investigated
in the literature. Not much consensus was achieved about the exchange rate response to
fiscal shocks. The starting point of the theoretical literature is Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995)
Redux model, where it is shown that a balanced-budget fiscal expansion – where government
spending is symmetrically distributed on domestic and foreign goods – depreciates the ex-
change rate. The intuition behind this result is simple: the increase in the tax burden affects
only the country that rises public consumption, while the expansionary effect of the increase
in demand is shared with the foreign country. The alternative assumption of complete home
bias in government consumption leads to a null effect on the exchange rate (Ganelli, 2005):
public spending is used to purchase only domestic goods and the cost of this policy is thus
perfectly offset by the gains in terms of higher domestic demand.
This result of the Redux model contradicts the well known implication of the static open-
economy version of the IS-LM model developed by Mundell and Fleming. Also DSGE open-
economy new Keynesian models, such as Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Devereux and
Engel (2003), find that a balanced-budget fiscal expansion induces and increase in private
consumption and, through international risk sharing, an exchange-rate appreciation. In
general, moreover, the baseline specification of the New Open-Economy Macroeconomics
(NOEM) models also implies an exchange-rate appreciation, following a balanced-budget
fiscal expansion. A depreciation may instead occur if we introduce incomplete financial
markets (Kollmann, 2010), productive government spending (Basu and Kollmann, 2013) or
spending reversals (Corsetti et al, 2012).
The recent empirical evidence on the subject is mixed, with results that depend on the
period and on the countries studied. Kim and Roubini (2008) and Monacelli and Perotti
(2010) provide time-series evidence that the real exchange rate depreciates in response to a
positive primary government deficit shock. Beetsma et al. (2008) and Be´ne´trix and Lane
(2013), using a panel-VAR analysis for the period 1971-2008, find that a positive shock
to government spending appreciates the real exchange rate in the EMU countries. This
result holds for different measures of government spending and it is more pronounced when
government consumption is chosen as dependent variable.1
This note generalizes the Redux model along two dimensions that prove to be critical in
shaping the exchange-rate response to fiscal shocks: the composition of public spending and
the monetary policy regime. We clarify that the appreciation implied by modern NOEM
models critically hinges on two specific features: endogenous monetary policy and home bias
1A similar result is found in Canova and Pappa (2007), who show that in the US and in the EMU
government spending shocks raise the state’s price level relative to the union, implying real appreciation.
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in public consumption.2 Once these two features are introduced in the Redux model, the
results of the two frameworks are reconciled, and the exchange rate appreciates in response
to fiscal shocks. In particular, we show that the composition of public spending is not the
only relevant variable to take into account when evaluating the international spillovers of
fiscal shocks, as claimed by Ganelli (2005), but that the monetary policy regime is also
key. Indeed, an increase in home-biased public spending is more expansionary at home
than abroad; if monetary policy is endogenous and countercyclical, this triggers a relatively
stronger monetary restriction at home, which appreciates the exchange rate. Our analysis
nests the two polar cases of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and (Ganelli, 2005).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we generalize the Redux model introducing
home bias in government consumption and endogenous monetary policy. Section 3 shows to
what extent the effects of balanced-budget fiscal shocks on the exchange rate depend on
the degree of home bias and the response coefficient in the monetary policy rule. Section 4
concludes.
2 A simple framework: generalizing the Redux model.
In this section we extend the simple Redux model of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) to study
the interplay between the degree of home bias in public spending and the monetary policy
regime in transmitting fiscal shocks to the exchange rate. Since the model builds on Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1995) and Ganelli (2005), in the paper we focus on the distintive elements of
our setup, and refer the reader to the aforementioned papers for details about the other
ingredients.
2.1 Households, technology, private and public consumption.
The Home country consists of a continuum of “Yeoman Farmer” households on the interval
[0, n], indexed by h, while Foreign agents are on the interval (n, 1], indexed by f . Domestic
households choose consumption C, real money balances M
P
and work effort in the production
of output y, in order to maximize3
∞∑
k=0
βk
[
logCt+k + χ log
(
Mt+k
Pt+k
)
− κ
2
yt+k(h)
2
]
2The empirical evidence for OECD countries supports the assumption of home-biased public spending.
See, for example Trionfetti (2000), Brulhart and Trionfetti (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2011).
3Foreign households face a symmetric problem.
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subject to the flow budget constraint
PtBt +Mt = Pt (1 + rt−1)Bt−1 +Mt−1 + Pt(h)yt(h)− PtCt − PtTt (1)
where Bt−1 and rt−1 denote, respectively, the stock of bonds carried over by home residents
from period t − 1, and the real interest rate earned on bonds between t − 1 and t, while
Tt are real taxes. The private consumption index C (C
∗ in the Foreign country) is a Dixit-
Stiglitz aggregator of all the brands produced worldwide, where domestic and foreign goods
are treated symmetrically:
C =
[∫ 1
0
c(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
(2)
in which θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two brands of goods, either
domestic of foreign, and z ∈ [0, 1]. The optimal intra-temporal allocation, then, implies the
following brand-specific private demand
c(z) =
(
p(z)
P
)−θ
CW ,
where CW ≡ nC + (1 − n)C∗ is world private consumption and P =
(∫ 1
0
p(z)1−θdh
) 1
1−θ
is
the domestic consumer-price index.
Differently from private consumption, public consumption is home biased. In particular,
we assume that the government of each country consumes composite bundles of both domestic
and foreign goods:
G =
[
v1/θG
θ−1
θ
H + (1− v)1/θG
θ−1
θ
F
] θ
θ−1
(3)
G∗ =
[
v∗
1/θ
G∗
θ−1
θ
H + (1− v∗)1/θG∗
θ−1
θ
F
] θ
θ−1
(4)
where the weights are, respectively, 1−v = (1−n)λ and v∗ = nλ, with λ ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover:4
GH =
[(
1
n
)1/θ ∫ n
0
g(h)
θ−1
θ dh
] θ
θ−1
GF =
[(
1
1− n
)1/θ ∫ 1
n
g(f)
θ−1
θ df
] θ
θ−1
.
4Analogous equations hold for the foreign country, with appropriate asterisks:
G∗H =
[(
1
n
)1/θ ∫ n
0
g∗(h)
θ−1
θ dh
] θ
θ−1
G∗F =
[(
1
1− n
)1/θ ∫ 1
n
g∗(f)
θ−1
θ df
] θ
θ−1
.
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This specification generalizes the Redux model analyzed in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995),
as it allows to account for an arbitrary degree of home bias in public consumption, measured
by (1 − λ). Indeed, in the Redux model – which is nested in our framework under the
calibration λ = 1 – there is no home bias, as government spending is defined identically to
private consumption, and it is therefore uniformly distributed across domestic and foreign
goods, as in (2). We will show that this is one of the two key features behind the Redux
model’s implications for the exchange-rate response to fiscal shocks. A second polar case that
our framework nests – when λ = 0 – is the one studied by Ganelli (2005), in which public
consumption is fully home biased and each government therefore consumes only domestic
goods, so that G = GH and G
∗ = G∗F .
Using the definition of v and v∗, equation (3) implies the following public demand for
brand h:
g(h) =
(
p(h)
PG
)−θ [
vG+ (1− v)QθG∗] , (5)
where
PG =
[
vP 1−θH + (1− v)P 1−θF
] 1
1−θ (6)
is the public consumption-based price index,
PH =
(
1
n
∫ n
0
p(h)1−θdh
) 1
1−θ
PF =
(
1
1− n
∫ 1
n
p(f)1−θdh
) 1
1−θ
(7)
are the home-currency producer-price indexes of domestic and foreign brands, respectively,5
and Q is the real exchange rate for public consumption, given by
Q ≡ EP
∗
G
PG
=
[
v∗ + (1− v∗)
(
PF
PH
)1−θ] 11−θ
[
v + (1− v)
(
PF
PH
)(1−θ)] 11−θ ,
in which E is the nominal exchange rate, defined as the nominal home-currency price of
foreign currency. Moreover, we assume that the law of one price holds (p(z) = Ep∗(z), for
all z ∈ [0, 1]): given unbiased private consumption bundles, purchasing power parity for the
latter holds as well, i.e. P = EP ∗. While PPP holds for private consumers, however, it does
not for public ones, as the composition of public spending treats asymmetrically domestic
and imported goods: PG 6= EP ∗G and Q may deviate from 1.
5For the foreign country, a set of equations analogous to (5)–(7) holds, with appropriate asterisks.
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Therefore, the producer of good h faces at time t the following demand curve:
ydt (h) =
(
pt(h)
Pt
)−θ
CWt +
(
pt(h)
PG,t
)−θ [
vGt + (1− v)QθtG∗t
]
. (8)
Aggregating (8) across domestic brands delivers the aggregate demand for domestic goods:
Yt =
(
PH,t
Pt
)−θ
CWt +
(
PH,t
PG,t
)−θ [
vGt + (1− v)QθtG∗t
]
, (9)
while the optimal choice of production effort implies the aggregate supply of domestic goods
Y
(θ+1)/θ
t =
(
θ − 1
θκ
)
1
Ct
[
CWt +
(
PG,t
Pt
)θ (
vGt + (1− v)QθtG∗t
)]1/θ
. (10)
2.2 Equilibrium, fiscal policy and monetary policy.
We analyze the equilibrium of the model when producer prices are set one period in advance:
they are predetermined at time t, but then they fully adjust after one period.6 We take a
log-linear approximation around an initial symmetric steady state where C0 = C
∗
0, Q
∗
0 = 1
and G0 = G
∗
0 = B0 = B
∗
0 = 0. We denote with x̂ and x̂ respectively the short-run and long-
run log-linear deviation of variable X from such steady state.7 In this approximation, since
producer prices are preset, consumer prices at time t are proportional to the nominal exchange
rate ê, and equilibrium domestic and foreign output are determined by the aggregate demand
schedules:
ŷ = ĉW + vĝ + (1− v)ĝ∗ + θ(1− n)ê (11)
ŷ∗ = ĉW + v∗ĝ + (1− v∗) ĝ∗ − θnê (12)
which, in relative terms, imply (using again the definition of v and v∗)
ŷ − ŷ∗ = (1− λ) (ĝ − ĝ∗) + θê. (13)
6This effectively breaks the dynamics of the model in only two periods: the short-run, in which prices
do not adjust and output is demand determined, and the long-run, when prices fully adjust and output is
therefore supply determined.
7Exceptions are variables whose steady state level is zero, like public spending – defined as ĝ ≡ dG
C
W
0
and
ĝ∗ ≡ dG∗
C
W
0
– and net foreign assets – defined as b̂ ≡ dB
C
W
0
and b̂
∗
≡ dB∗
C
W
0
. Notice that the latter only change in
the long-run.
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Were prices fully flexible, instead, output would be determined by aggregate supply:
(θ + 1)ŷ = −θĉ+ ĉW + vĝ + (1− v)ĝ∗ (14)
(θ + 1)ŷ∗ = −θĉ∗ + ĉW + v∗ĝ + (1− v∗)ĝ∗, (15)
implying, in relative terms
(θ + 1) (ŷ − ŷ∗) = −θ (ĉ− ĉ∗) + (1− λ) (ĝ − ĝ∗) . (16)
The government sets the amount of public consumption G and finances it through lump-
sum taxes T . Using the balanced-budget restriction in the domestic and foreign budget
constraints, we can derive the long-run net foreign asset position of the two countries
b̂ = ŷ − ĉ− ĝ − (1− n) ê
b̂
∗
= ŷ∗ − ĉ∗ − ĝ∗ + nê,
which, together with the market clearing condition nb̂+ (1− n)̂b
∗
= 0 and (13), imply
b̂
1− n = (θ − 1)ê− (ĉ− ĉ
∗)− λ (ĝ − ĝ∗) . (17)
Notice that, regardless of the actual degree of home bias in public spending, the relation-
ship linking long-run changes in consumption and net foreign assets is the same as in the
Redux model:
ĉ− ĉ∗ = rb̂(1 + θ)
(1− n)2θ , (18)
where r ≡ 1−β
β
and ĉ − ĉ∗ = ĉ − ĉ∗, as implied by the cross-country difference of the con-
sumption Euler equations.
Combining (18) with (17) allows to derive an equation describing the equilibrium in the
goods market, and the role played by fiscal policy:
ê =
θ(1 + β) + 1− β
(1− β) (θ2 − 1)
(
ĉ− ĉ∗)+ λ
θ − 1
(
ĝ − ĝ∗) . (19)
This schedule, which we label GG in analogy to Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), is upward-
sloping in the plane ( ĉ−ĉ∗, ê ) because relative domestic consumption can rise, ceteris paribus,
only if the exchange rate depreciates in the short run, thereby allowing domestic output to
increase. Notice that the degree of home bias in public spending determines the extent to
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which short-run fiscal shocks affect the equilibrium in the goods market and thereby the
nominal exchange rate. In the Redux case (λ = 1) a domestic fiscal expansion shifts the GG
schedule upwards to the maximum extent, thereby inducing depreciation pressures on the
nominal exchange rate. In the opposite polar case of complete home bias (λ = 0), instead,
a fiscal expansion does not affect the goods market – as in Ganelli (2005a) – given that the
higher fiscal spending and higher taxation affect only domestic agents.
The early NOEM literature has modeled monetary policy in terms of the central bank’s
control of the money supply. We assume that money supply is controlled – both at home
and abroad – through feedback rules of the kind
m̂ = µ− φŷ (20)
m̂∗ = µ∗ − φŷ∗, (21)
The money supply rules (20)-(21) can be seen as a monetarist variant of the Taylor rule,
in which a systematic, endogenous component allows short-run money supply to respond
counter-cyclically to domestic and foreign output respectively.8 In the feedback rules above,
µ and µ∗ are exogenous, permanent monetary policy shocks, and φ > 0 is the response
coefficient.9
Notice that, again, this framework generalizes the Redux model, where monetary policy is
entirely exogenous, and which is therefore nested under the calibration φ = 0.10 We will show
that this is the second key element behind the Redux model’s implications for the exchange
rate response to fiscal shocks.
The money-supply differential, therefore, reads:
m̂− m̂∗ = (µ− µ∗)− φ(1− λ) (ĝ − ĝ∗)− θφê, (22)
where we used equation (13) to substitute out relative output.
Moreover, consider the cross-country difference in money demands:
m̂− m̂∗ − ê = ĉ− ĉ∗ − β
1− β
(
ê− ê
)
, (23)
and use the long-run versions of (22) and (23) to derive the equilibrium long-run exchange
rate:
ê =
µ− µ∗ − (ĉ− ĉ∗)
1 + θφ
. (24)
8We consider a feedback rule responding to output only, as domestic prices are rigid in the short run.
9For analytical convenience, we assume symmetric response coefficients across countries.
10This is also the case in Ganelli (2005).
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Equations (22), (23) and (24) determine the equilibrium in the money market, which is
synthetically described by the following MM schedule:
ê =
(µ− µ∗)− (ĉ− ĉ∗)
1 + θφ
− φ(1− λ)(1− β)
β + (1− β) (1 + θφ) (ĝ − ĝ
∗) . (25)
As in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Ganelli (2005a), the MM schedule is downward-
sloping in the plane ( ĉ− ĉ∗, ê ) because an increase in relative domestic consumption raises
domestic money demand relatively more than abroad, implying – ceteris paribus – a relative
excess demand for domestic currency and thereby an appreciation of the nominal exchange
rate. The required appreciation, however, is smaller under endogenous monetary policy, as
the ensuing reduction in relative output triggers an increase in relative money supply, restor-
ing the money-market equilibrium more rapidly: the MM is therefore flatter. A permanent
increase in relative money supply (increase in µ − µ∗), on the other hand, by inducing a
relative excess supply of domestic currency, shifts the MM schedule upwards and implies
depreciation pressures.
Differently from Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Ganelli (2005a), however, the feedback
component of the monetary policy rules implies that the MM schedule shifts also in response
to temporary fiscal shocks, as they induce short-run fluctuations in output and thereby
trigger an endogenous response of money supply. Notice that the extent to which the MM
shifts depends also on the degree of home bias in public spending, (1 − λ). If the latter is
uniformly distributed across domestic and foreign goods (λ = 1, as in the Redux model),
indeed, the output effects of a short-run fiscal expansion are identical at home and abroad:
monetary policy responds symmetrically in the two countries and relative money supply does
not change, leaving also the MM unchanged.11 For any nonzero degree of home bias in public
consumption, however, the endogenous monetary policy response will be asymmetric across
countries, and the ensuing change in relative money supply will shift the MM downwards
and produce appreciation pressures on the nominal exchange rate, the more so the stronger
the home bias.
3 Fiscal shocks and the exchange rate.
The simple framework outlined above allows to analyze the effects on the nominal exchange
rate of a temporary fiscal expansion, under alternative scenarios, and to study the implica-
tions of the two features that we added to the Redux model: home-bias in fiscal spending
11The MM schedule would move also in this case if the response coefficients in the monetary policy rules
were different across countries.
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and endogenous monetary policy.
The first scenario is one in which public consumption is uniformly distributed between
domestic and foreign goods – i.e. λ = 1, like in the Redux model. In this scenario, whether
monetary policy is exogenous as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) – i.e. φ = 0 in (20)–(21) – or
endogenous – i.e. φ > 0 – is irrelevant for the exchange-rate response to fiscal shocks.
As shown by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), indeed, the GG schedule in this case reads as
ê =
θ(1 + β) + 1− β
(1− β) (θ2 − 1)
(
ĉ− ĉ∗)+ 1
θ − 1
(
ĝ − ĝ∗) . (26)
On the other hand, equation (25) in this case implies ŷ − ŷ∗ = θê, and the monetary
policy rules (in difference terms) therefore read
m̂− m̂∗ = (µ− µ∗)− θφê, (27)
which shows that, regardless of the magnitude of the response coefficient φ, the relative money
supply does not endogenously respond to fiscal shocks, implying that the MM schedule
becomes simply
ê =
(µ− µ∗)− (ĉ− ĉ∗)
1 + θφ
. (28)
Therefore, a balanced-budget government spending shock at Home shifts the GG up-
wards, as in the Redux model, while it does not move the MM schedule, even if monetary
policy is endogenous. This result is graphically shown in Figure 1: a temporary fiscal shock
depreciates the exchange rate in equilibrium. Indeed, when public consumption is uniformly
distributed among domestic and foreign brands, a government spending shock, regardless of
the country of origin, acts as a global shock. As a consequence, output in both countries
responds symmetrically and relative money supply therefore does not change.12 Private con-
sumption, on the other hand, falls more at home than abroad, as the tax burden is only
borne by domestic consumers. The ensuing reduction in relative money demand implies an
excess supply of domestic currency and, thereby, a nominal depreciation of the exchange rate.
This is the familiar implication of the Redux model. Allowing for an endogenous component
in monetary policy is not enough to qualitatively affect the result derived by Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1995).
The second scenario is the one analyzed by Ganelli (2005a), in which public consumption
is fully home biased (λ = 0). In this scenario, the specific assumption about monetary
12This depends on the assumption that monetary policy at home and abroad use identical response coef-
ficients φ. In the case of asymmetric response coefficients, the specific assumption about whether monetary
policy is endogenous or not does, indeed, affect the results.
GG
MM
GG0
bc  bc⇤
be
2
Figure 1: A temporary expansion in domestic government spending, with zero home bias (λ = 1) and
endogenous monetary policy (φ > 0).
policy is key to understand the exchange-rate response to fiscal shocks. If monetary policy
is exogenous – i.e. φ = 0, as in Ganelli (2005a) – it is straightforward to see that neither the
GG
ê =
θ(1 + β) + 1− β
(1− β) (θ2 − 1)
(
ĉ− ĉ∗) (29)
nor the MM
ê = (µ− µ∗)− (ĉ− ĉ∗) (30)
respond to fiscal shocks. As a consequence, a temporary expansion in domestic public con-
sumption does not have any effect on the nominal exchange rate. This is the quasi-neutrality
result derived in Ganelli (2005a): with full home bias in public consumption and exogenous
monetary policy, the expansion in public spending falls entirely on domestic goods, and the
implied tax burden is borne entirely by domestic consumers. As a consequence, domestic and
foreign consumption do not react, and the exchange rate neither depreciates nor appreciates.
The only variable on which the fiscal shock is not neutral is domestic output, which increases
with a unitary multiplier, with no spillover to the current account or foreign output.
If instead monetary policy is endogenous (φ > 0) the implication is radically different.
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GG
MM
MM0
bc  bc⇤
be
1
Figure 2: A temporary expansion in domestic government spending, with full home bias (λ = 0) and
endogenous monetary policy (φ > 0).
Indeed, while the GG schedule is still (29), equilibrium in the money market is now described
by the following MM:
ê =
(µ− µ∗)− (ĉ− ĉ∗)
1 + θφ
− φ(1− β)
β + (1− β) (1 + θφ) (ĝ − ĝ
∗) . (31)
The asymmetric response of real output, indeed, triggers an asymmetric endogenous
response of monetary policy as well, which reduces relative money supply, thereby implying
a nominal exchange-rate appreciation. This is captured, in Figure 2, by a downward shift in
the MM schedule.
A scenario in which public spending is fully home biased and monetary policy has an en-
dogenous feedback component, therefore, reverses the result of the Redux model and restores
the basic implication of the Mundell-Fleming model, that an increase in public spending
determines an exchange-rate appreciation.13
In the general case of incomplete home bias in public consumption and endogenous mon-
etary policy, described by equations (19) and (25), both transmission mechanisms discussed
13It is important to notice, however, that the transmission channel here is different than Mundell-Fleming’s.
GG
MM
GG0
MM0
bc  bc⇤
be
3
Figure 3: A temporary expansion in domestic government spending, with incomplete home bias (0 < λ < 1)
and endogenous monetary policy (φ > 0).
so far are simultaneously at work, as displayed by Figure 3. The GG schedule shifts up-
wards, the more so the less home-biased public consumption (the higher λ), and the MM
downwards, the more so the more endogenous monetary policy (the higher φ). Whether the
equilibrium response of the exchange rate implies a depreciation or an appreciation depends
therefore on the relative importance of the two additional features that we added to the
Redux model.
To explore the implications of our generalized Redux model, Figure 4 plots the equilibrium
change in the nominal exchange rate for a calibrated economy, for different values of the two
key parameters: λ and φ.14 The figure displays the result already implied by the graphical
analysis: the more home-biased public spending and the more endogenous monetary policy,
the more a temporary fiscal expansion implies an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate.
Interestingly, however, looking at the contour lines at the base of the plot (in particular
the orange line starting from the origin) reveals that most of the surface is below the zero
plane, suggesting that moderate degrees of home bias in public consumption and endogenous
14The calibration of β is consistent with an annualized steady state interest rate of 4%, while the price-
elasticity of brand-specific demands is taken from Rotemberg and Woodford(1997): θ = 7.66. The qualitative
implication of Figure 4 is robust to alternative calibrations of β and θ.
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Figure 4: Exchange-rate short-run response to a temporary expansion in domestic government spending:
the role of the degree of home-bias (λ) and endogenous monetary policy (φ).
response of monetary policy to the cycle, are enough to reverse the implication of the Redux
model, and restore the Mundell-Fleming result that a temporary fiscal expansion appreciates
the nominal exchange rate.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the determinants of the exchange-rate response to fiscal shocks in a
generalized version of the Redux model, by highlighting the role played by the monetary
policy regime and public spending composition.
We show that the effects of balanced-budget fiscal shocks on the exchange rate criti-
cally depend on the degree of home bias in public spending and on the monetary policy
regime. When government consumption is uniformly distributed across domestic and foreign
goods an increase in domestic public spending acts as a global shock. Domestic and foreign
output respond symmetrically, while domestic private consumption falls more than abroad.
With relative money supply unchanged, the ensuing reduction in money demand leads to
an exchange-rate depreciation. On the other hand, when government consumption is home-
13
biased (partially or fully), the exchange rate appreciates if monetary policy is countercyclical:
the increase in relative domestic output implied by the fiscal expansion induces a reduction
in relative money supply and, therefore, a nominal exchange-rate appreciation.
By assuming realistic features such as endogenous monetary policy and even a moder-
ate degree of home bias in public consumption, our generalized Redux model exhibits the
same qualitative results of both the static Mundell-Fleming framework and the prototypical
NOEM-DSGE model, such as Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) or Devereux and Engel (2003).
Finally, Di Giorgio et al. (2014) show that a similar interplay between the degree of home
bias in public spending and the monetary policy regime is crucial to shape the exchange-rate
response to fiscal shocks in a perpetual-youth DSGE model, where the implied departure
from Ricardian equivalence allows for a thorough analysis of different financing schemes for
fiscal expansions.
14
References
.
Basu, Parantap and Robert Kollmann (2013) “Productive Government Purchases and the
Real Exchange Rate”, The Manchester School, vol. 81(4), pp. 461–469
Beetsma, Roel M. W. J., Frank Klasssen and Massimo Giuliodori (2008) “The Effects of
Public Spending Shocks on Trade Balances and Budget Deficits in the European Union”,
Journal of European Economic Association vol. 6, pp. 414–423
Be´ne´trix, Agu´stin and Philip R. Lane (2013) “Fiscal Shocks and the Real Exchange Rate”,
International Journal of Central Banking vol. 9(3), pp. 1–32
Brulhart, M. and F. Trionfetti. (2004) “Public expenditure, international specialisation
and agglomeration”, European Economic Review 48, pp. 851–881
Canova, Fabio and Evi Pappa (2007) “Price Differentials in Monetary Unions: the Role
of Fiscal Shocks”, Economic Journal, vol. 117(520), pp. 713–737
Corsetti, Giancarlo and Paolo Pesenti (2001) “Welfare And Macroeconomic Interdepen-
dence”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 116(2), pp. 421–445
Corsetti, Giancarlo, Andre´ Meier and Gernot J. Mu¨ller (2012) “Twin Deficit or Twin
Divergence? Fiscal Policy, Current Account, and Real Exchange Rate in the US”, The
Review of Economics and Statistics vol. 94(4), pp. 878–895
Devereux, Michael and Charles Engel (2003) “Monetary Policy in the Open Economy
Revisited: Price Setting and Exchange-Rate Flexibility?”, Review of Economic Studies, vol.
70, pp. 765–783
Di Giorgio, Giorgio, Salvatore Nistico` and Guido Traficante (2014). “Fiscal Shocks and
the Exchange Rate”, CASMEF Working Paper n. 1
Ganelli, Giovanni. (2005) ““Home Bias in Government Spending and Quasi Neutrality of
Fiscal Shocks”, Macroeconomic Dynamics, 9, pp. 288–294
Kim, Soyoung and Nouriel Roubini (2008) “Twin Deficit or Twin Divergence? Fiscal
Policy, Current Account, and Real Exchange Rate in the US”, Journal of International
Economics vol. 4, pp. 362–383
Kollmann, Robert (2010) “Government Purchases and the Real Exchange Rate”, Open
Economies Review, vol. 21, pp. 49–64
Monacelli, Tommaso and Roberto Perotti (2010) “Fiscal Policy, the Real Exchange Rate
and Traded Goods”, The Economic Journal vol. 120, pp. 437–461
Nakamura, Emi and Jo´n Steinsson (2011) “Fiscal Stimulus in a Monetary Union: Evidence
from U.S. Regions”,” NBER Working Paper 17391
Obstfeld, Maurice and Kenneth S. Rogoff (1995) “Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux”,
15
Journal of Political Economy, 103, 624-60
Obstfeld, Maurice and Kenneth S. Rogoff (1996) “Foundations of International Macroe-
conomics”, MIT Press, Cambridge
Trionfetti, Federico (2000) “Discriminatory Public Procurement and International Trade”,
Blackwell Publishers
16
